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ABSTRACT 
RFID is a powerful new technology that has the potential to 
allow commercial retailers to undermine individual control over 
private information.  Despite the potential of RFID to undermine 
personal control over such information, the federal government 
has not enacted a set of practicable standards to ensure that 
personal data does not become widely misused by commercial 
entities.  Although some potential privacy abuses could be 
addressed by modifying RFID technology, this iBrief argues that 
it would be wise to amend the Privacy Act of 1974 so that 
corporations would have a statutory obligation to preserve 
individual anonymity and respect the privacy preferences of 
consumers. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Modern technology is about to dethrone the old adage that 
‘money makes the world go round.’  In some countries, the more apt 
adage may very well soon turn out to be ‘RFID makes the world go 
round.’  RFID, shorthand for “radio frequency identification 
technology,” is already being used as a mandatory substitute for money 
in some private establishments in Japan.2  This simple yet remarkable 
technology consists of a small microchip, a protective sheath or 
container, and a miniature embedded antenna; these components taken 
together are referred to as RFID tags. 3   RFID tags are capable of 
transmitting electronic-product-code (ePC) information to RFID 
                                                     
1 LLM/J.D. 2006, Duke University School of Law, M.A. 2000, Stanford 
University, B.A. 1997, Loyola University Chicago.  This article has benefited 
from the helpful guidance of Seth F. Kreimer, David Lange, H. Jefferson 
Powell, and Jedediah Purdy.  Although all remaining errors and misstatements 
are the author’s alone, Erica Platt in particular deserves hearty thanks for many 
interesting conversations about RFID technology that stimulated some of the 
principal arguments in this article. 
2 Tracking Arcade Game Players, RFID IN JAPAN, Nov. 6, 2004, 
http://ubiks.net/local/blog/jmt/stuff3/. 
3 KLAUS FINKENZELLER, RFID HANDBOOK: RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION 
AND APPLICATIONS 7 (1999). 
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readers—devices designed to store, process and archive tag data.4  Since 
these tags are often quite small—the most technologically sophisticated 
variants are now just the size of a grain of rice5— it is easy to see why 
they have been heralded as a fantastic replacement for traditional 
currency:  if our currency can be embedded in a tiny RFID tag, it will be 
both difficult to steal, eminently portable, and easy to replace in the 
event the tag is lost or destroyed.           
¶2 In addition to providing one technological solution to the search 
for a workable form of “digital money,” RFID has also been used to 
monitor everything from commercial purchases 6  to the physical 
movements of government officials7 to the misadventures of naturally 
curious children. 8   In February of 2005 the U.S. State Department 
revealed a plan to embed RFID chips in every newly issued U.S. 
passport, thereby broadcasting on demand the names, addresses, and 
digitized photos of all American citizens to a database—ostensibly9 so 
that borders can be more effectively managed and threats to national 
security more readily prevented. 10   Data storage and transmission 
                                                     
4 Intermec Technologies Corporation, RFID Overview: Introduction to Radio 
Frequency Identification, FORBES.COM, Jan. 1, 2002, available at 
http://itresearch.forbes.com/data/detail?id=1010607230_712&type=RES&src=T
OPRES. 
5 FDA Approves Computer Chip for Humans, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 13, 2004, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6237364/. 
6 Kim Yong-Young, Radio Chips May Track Bank Notes, CNET NEWS.COM, 
May 23, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-1009155.html.  
7 Peter Lewis, RFID: Getting Under Your Skin?, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 5, 
2004, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/08/05/commentary/ontechnology/rfid/. 
8 Jo Best, Schoolchildren to be RFID Chipped: Japanese Authorities Decide 
Tracking is the Best Way to Protect Kids, SILICON.COM, July 8, 2004, 
http://networks.silicon.com/lans/0,39024663,39122042,00.htm. 
9 Privacy advocates have suggested that one of the consequences, if not the 
purposes, of embedding RFID chips in passports is that identity theft and 
commercial data collectors will have an easier time clandestinely obtaining 
personally identifying information.  It is important, however, to distinguish 
between the purpose of adopting RFID technology, on the one hand, and the 
probable effects, desirable and unsavory alike, on the other.  See Ryan Singel, 
American Passports to Get Chipped, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 21, 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,65412,00.html. 
10 Electronic Passport, 70 Fed. Reg. 8305 (proposed Feb. 18, 2005) (to be 
codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 51).  In April of 2005, Frank Moss, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Passport Services, said that the federal government was 
reevaluating its proposed RFID system in light of widespread consensus that the 
unencrypted personal information embedded in RFID tags could easily be 
intercepted by nonauthorized third-parties.  Kim Zetter, Feds Rethinking RFID 
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functionality, however, is only the beginning.  In addition, DeltaTRAK 
recently announced that it has developed an RFID-based system for 
detecting food spoilage during transit by monitoring temperature and 
humidity fluctuations in food containment units.11  Further, IBM and 
EPC Global, the most powerful RFID standards-setting organization, 
recently unveiled a plan to “create a database that contains the life 
history of a product,” thus providing businesses with a new way to 
streamline business supply chains.12  All things considered, RFID is a 
promising technology many of us may soon be using to keep tabs on 
virtually everything that is important to us—our kids, our finances, our 
loved ones, and perhaps even our periodically wayward political figures.  
¶3 Nevertheless, RFID is also a technology that could easily be 
abused.  For instance, if private companies embedded RFID tags in 
products deemed dangerous or socially harmful, the implementation of a 
centralized database of consumer purchasing patterns could be justified 
to allow the government to track such purchases.  This could have the 
unwelcome effect of subjecting all consumers to suspicionless 
monitoring; however, it should also be noted that for some products—
e.g., firearms and chemicals commonly used to make explosives—RFID 
could also provide just the kind of highly accurate tracking system that 
would benefit society.  In any event, credible evidence that private 
companies intend to deploy this new technology as widely as possible is 
mounting.13  Moreover, it is also clear from a number of pilot tests in 
Europe that corporations are eager—without customer consent or 
authorization—to embed RFID chips in loyalty cards to monitor 
purchasing habits.14   
¶4 Under current privacy law, it is unlikely that consumer groups 
would have the power to prevent private companies from adopting RFID 
technology for a number of interlocking reasons.  First, the Privacy Act 
                                                                                                                       
Passport, WIRED.COM, Apr. 26, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,67333,00.html. 
11 DeltaTRAK Launches RFID Humidity Sensor, FOODPRODUCTIONDAILY.COM, 
May 11, 2004, http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/news/news-
NG.asp?n=55887-deltatrak-launches-rfid. 
12 Renee Boucher Ferguson, Dressing Up RFID for Max Appeal, 
EXTREMETECH.COM, Nov. 8, 2004, at 
http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1558,1722418,00.asp. 
13 World’s Third Largest Retailed Completes Warehouse RFID Implementation, 
Information Week, Jan. 20, 2005 (noting that Metro Group, the world’s third 
largest retailer, recently completed an RFID implementation at its largest 
warehouse in Germany), 
http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=57702741. 
14 See Scandal: The RFID Tag Hidden In METRO’S Loyalty Card, 
SPYCHIPS.COM, http://www.spychips.com/metro/scandal-payback.html.  
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of 1974 (“Privacy Act” or “Act”)15—the most comprehensive U.S. law 
pertaining to privacy—does not apply to private entities, but rather only 
to government agencies or government-controlled corporations.16  Thus, 
private corporations are not bound by the fair information practices, 
open-access rules, and data-ownership principles embodied in the Act.17  
But even if they were, consumer groups would arguably have a difficult 
time preventing private companies from gathering data, since the Act 
does not in principle proscribe data collection but merely proscribes a 
narrow subset of data misuse.18  Second, constitutional protections are of 
little use since the type of data that RFID is capable of collecting is 
publicly ascertainable, and therefore probably not subject to protection 
under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 19   Third, even in 
jurisdictions that recognize the torts of intrusion and the appropriation of 
private facts in consumer contexts,20 consumers would only be able to 
recoup damages ex post; tort law is thus of no help in preventing data 
aggregation per se. 21   This third feature of our privacy regime is 
                                                     
15 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). 
16 Id. at § 552(a)(1).  
17 James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Surveillance, Records & 
Computers: Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1459, 1474 (2004) (pointing out that “[t]he act requires notice to, and consent 
from, individuals when the government collects and shares information about 
them”).  
18 Id. (pointing out that while the “Privacy Act does include a provision that 
extends its coverage to databases created under government contract,” this 
particular provision “does not include governmental searches of private sector 
databases already compiled and maintained for other purposes”). 
19 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (holding that “what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection”). 
20 It is highly unlikely that most jurisdictions would recognize these tort claims 
in the consumer context.  The private facts appropriated usually have to be of an 
intimate and sensitive nature, strongly suggesting that tort theory is of little use 
in articulating what is objectionable in the kind of data collection and item 
tracking that RFID enables.  The reason this is so is illustrated nicely by 
Professor Post’s general observation that invasion of privacy tort claims are 
successful only when “it can be demonstrated that a defendant has transgressed 
the kind of social norms whose violation would properly be viewed with outrage 
or affront, and that the function of this relief is to redress ‘injury to 
personality’”.  Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:  Community 
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 962 (1989).   
21 A point of clarification is necessary here.  In theory tort law could provide 
some degree of deterrence, assuming that damage awards available to private 
citizens for the torts of intrusion or appropriate of private facts were substantial 
enough to prevent companies from collecting personally identifiable information 
without customers’ consent.  But in practice, tort law is highly unlikely to deter 
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particularly discomfiting given that many of the recent private initiatives 
designed to mitigate the dangers of data collection through technological 
solutions have been wholly unsuccessful and fail to embody sound 
privacy values.22      
¶5 There are two broad threats to privacy posed by this new 
technology.  First, under our current privacy regime private companies 
are at liberty to gather, process, and share customer data without 
obtaining customer consent to specific data aggregation, archival, and 
sharing policies and procedures.23  This feature of our privacy regime is 
                                                                                                                       
private companies because those companies understand that the value of a 
potential damage award is unlikely to be large enough for a private citizen to 
justify bringing suit in the first place.   There are two reasons that this is so.  
First, common law privacy jurisprudence applicable in these tort cases requires 
that a breach of a privacy right be “offensive to the reasonable person.”  W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 117 (5th ed. 1984).  As 
many commentators have recognized, this transforms privacy into a “moving 
target,” and is for that reason an unreasonable, unworkable standard.  Some have 
even suggested that that “ultimate consequence of such an approach may be no 
privacy at all.”  Julie E. Cohen, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights 
Management: DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY L. TECH. L.J. 575, 592 (2003).  
Second, in order to establish a violation of privacy under current tort law one 
must in most cases show that a private fact was disclosed in a way that caused 
emotional or psychic distress.  It is hard to imagine a court awarding money 
damages to a plaintiff that claimed her privacy was violated because a company 
used—without disclosing—her private consumer preferences.  See Randall P. 
Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News and Social Change, 
1890–1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133 1170 n.111 (“Successful privacy cases have 
never been legion. And recent experience is, if anything, worse both as to the 
frequency of successful claims and as to the analytical difficulties associated 
with rationalizing a favorable result.”). 
22 See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of 
Privacy, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶89 (2001) (“[P3P] maps nicely to the 
anti-regulatory views espoused by industry but not at all to the well-established 
tradition of privacy protection in law.  P3P in the end is an invitation to reject 
privacy as a political value that can be protected in law and to ask individuals to 
now bargain with those in possession of their secrets over how much privacy 
they can afford.”).   
23 See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture:  A Privacy 
Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003) 
(“Large companies like Acxiom, Experian, and R.L. Polk & Co. possess profiles 
of nearly every American consumer and household.  Acxiom's InfoBase profiler 
collects data from more than 15 million sources and contains demographic 
information on 95 percent of U.S. households.  Experian boasts that its 
databases cover 98 percent of U.S. households and can contain more than 1000 
data items per household.  Polk's ‘Automotive Profiling System’ contains 
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particularly vexing given that we live in an era in which identity theft is 
particularly common24 and extremely hard to prevent25; thus control over 
private data is extremely important.  Second, the absence of meaningful 
regulation of new surveillance technologies, particularly RFID, is having 
a profound effect on the broader social norms that privacy protects.  
Private facts about consumer preference patterns are currently treated as 
cost-free commodities for corporate America:  companies need not pay 
for the privilege of aggregating and using data, nor is consumer consent 
regarded as necessary because consumer surveillance has already been 
presented as a common practice that is usually in consumers’ best 
interests.26 
¶6 This iBrief argues that meaningful statutory regulation is 
necessary for private-and public-sector RFID programs that collect 
consumer data for purchase forecasting, preference modeling, and risk 
profiling.  The form that effective regulation should take is a matter of 
dispute, but two models will be explored, a control oriented model and a 
choice oriented approach. 27   Under the control oriented model, the 
Privacy Act should be amended to embody privacy-protecting principles 
that preserve the values of anonymity, seclusion, and control over certain 
types of personal information.  Under the choice oriented model, the 
                                                                                                                       
demographic and lifestyle information on more than 150 million vehicle owners 
and 111 million households.”). 
24 Timothy O’Brien, Identity Theft is an Epidemic, Can it Be Stopped?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/business/yourmoney/24theft.html?ex=110
0322000&en=bf4604784fbfd500&ei=5070&oref=login. 
25 See id. (suggesting that identity theft may be impossible to prevent since there 
is no way to anticipate the technical creativity of ID-thieves).  
26 See McClurg, supra note 23, at 66-7 (“Online, Internet advertising companies 
such as DoubleClick track the clickstream of Internet users across the World 
Wide Web, creating detailed profiles of their behavior.  By storing small text 
files called ‘cookies’ on the computers of persons visiting DoubleClick-
affiliated sites, the company has stockpiled profiles of more than 100 million 
individuals.  Consumer profiling is not limited to companies that specialize in 
data collection.  Online booksellers and other retailers profile customers by 
tracking the products they view or buy online.  Telephone companies profile 
customers based on when, how often, and what numbers they call.  
Supermarkets profile shopping habits by recording and analyzing purchasing 
information collected through discount or loyalty club cards.  Banks and other 
financial institutions construct profiles based on personal financial data.  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allows them to share customer financial data 
with affiliated companies without restriction and to share it with anyone else if 
customers do not explicitly opt out of such sharing.”). 
27 For a general overview of the difference between control and choice-oriented 
approaches to informational privacy, see Rotenberg, supra note 22, at ¶¶62–71. 
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Privacy Act need only be amended in the most minor way—that is, to 
require corporations to obtain explicit authorization from consumers 
before gathering or using their private information.  Although both of 
these approaches toward new regulation could very well involve 
modifying RFID technology, the status of informational privacy as a 
public good requires that basic, fundamental control rights be given the 
imprimatur of law even where technological safeguards serve as part of a 
meaningful solution.         
¶7 This iBrief is segmented into three sections.  Part I explores the 
historical development and current capabilities of RFID.  Part II 
considers the implications of this new technology for privacy.  This 
section focuses on the potential for RFID to serve in the near future as 
the primary tool for tracking physical objects and people; specifically, 
this section explores the arguments weighing in favor and against the 
control and choice-oriented approaches to regulating consumer privacy.  
Part II ultimately advocates a control-oriented model of privacy 
protection is advocated in this Part, mainly in light of the potential for 
mass consumer surveillance to become a central feature of commerce in 
the near future if decisive legislative action is not taken.  Finally, Part III 
proposes an amendment to the Privacy Act of 1974 and explores the 
advantages and disadvantages of such an amendment. 
I. THE CAPABILITIES OF RFID TECHNOLOGY 
¶8 The powerful object identification and tracking capabilities of 
RFID are made possible by a discovery made just before the outbreak of 
World War II.  Scientists at that time discovered that radio waves can be 
used to identify specific objects in the physical world if those objects are 
affixed with unique identifying numbers or codes.28  As long as an object 
has a unique number associated with it, accurate identification would be 
a very simple affair.29  This discovery proved quite useful in the World 
War II, since the United Kingdom needed an effective, reliable way to 
distinguish its own fighter planes from inbound German fighters.30  RFID 
fit the bill because it allowed for the reliable, remote identification of 
objects.31  
¶9 RFID was never adopted as the standard for object identification.  
In the 1970s, the bar code—or Universal Product Code (UPC)—became 
the most widely used method for identifying and tracking objects as they 
                                                     
28 WIKIPEDIA, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFID (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
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passed through commercial channels.32  UPC labels were never the ideal 
technology for managing supply chains and monitoring inventory, for 
three simple reasons:  1) the labels themselves are easy to disfigure or 
disable, 2) UPCs must be read at a certain angle, slowing down the 
monitoring process considerably, and 3) UPCs are typically read 
sequentially—meaning that multiple UPC labels cannot be read 
simultaneously.33   
¶10 RFID is a much more robust technology.  While RFID tags can 
be disabled through physical abuse or destruction, they need not be read 
at an angle and they can be read simultaneously.  The typical system 
includes tags, an antenna, and a reader or scanner. 34   Tags, usually 
miniature silicon chips affixed to micro-antennae, come in two 
varieties—active and passive.35  Active tags contain a power source that 
enables them to send data without being prompted by a reader; passive 
tags cannot transmit data themselves but are merely read by local reading 
devices.36  Active and passive tags usually have read-write capability, a 
feature that is extremely appealing given the advent of the electronic 
product code (ePC).  The ePC is a 96-bit numerical code saved onto the 
RFID tag itself, and is best viewed as an extension of the current UCC-
12 protocol for naming and tracking objects globally.37  The advantages 
of using RFID tags in conjunction with the ePC are numerous:  not only 
can these small, often unnoticeable tags be logged without cumbersome 
physical manipulation, most RFID systems can read ePC numbers 
through fog, snow and even paint so long as the tags themselves are 
within standard read range.38   
                                                     
32 Checkout Lines Could Become History, USATODAY.COM, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/science/stuffworks/2001-04-24-smart-
labels.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
33 WIKIPEDIA, UNIVERSAL PRODUCT CODE, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Product_Code (last visited Aug. 25, 
2005). 
34 Intermec Technologies Corporation, RFID Overview, supra note 4, at 3. 
35 Active tags are generally larger, more expensive, and have a longer read 
range.  Passive tags, on the other hand, are often very small, inexpensive, and 
offer long operational life.  See WIKIPEDIA, supra note 28, at Types of RFID 
TAGS. 
36 The Association of the Automatic Identification and Data Capture Industry, 
Draft Paper on the Characteristics of RFID Systems, AIMGLOBAL.ORG, July 
2000, http://www.aimglobal.org/technologies/rfid/what_is_rfid.asp. 
37 Mark Roberti, ePC Networking on Display, RFIDJOURNAL.COM (May 24, 
2004), http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/957/1/1/.
38 Some RFID chips can be temporarily disabled by enveloping them in Mylar 
fabric or by placing a metal plate between the chips and a reader.  Josh McHugh, 
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¶11 ODIN Technologies, an RFID systems integrator based in 
Reston, Virginia, recently released a comprehensive performance study 
of eight different tag-types.39  The study revealed what many industry 
analysts had been expecting to hear:  the best passive tags can be read 
from multiple angles and while moving at considerable speed—from 600 
to 1200 feet per second.40  Yet even though passive tags can be read very 
quickly, they generally cannot be read from very far away unless they 
operate on the higher frequencies.  High frequency tags can currently be 
read from up to 3 or 4 meters away, 41  though in the near future 
technological improvements will make it feasible to read high frequency 
tags from a greater distance.42  RFID is thus an extremely powerful 
technology that allows for the quick and accurate identification of 
physical objects—from foodstuffs to clothing to electronic gadgets.  To 
get a sense of just how powerful this technology is, imagine for just a 
moment a machine that could instantly identify the origin, cost, and 
properties of every consumer item carried (electronic gadgets, e.g.), worn 
(clothing, e.g.), or consumed (food and drink, e.g.).  That machine is 
RFID.  And the technology to make that machine exists today, right now.  
¶12 The potential range of uses for RFID technology is hard to 
predict at this nascent state of development.  But there are a number of 
important uses already underway: 
1. GENERAL TRACKING AND SECURITY 
PURPOSES:  Tagging airline baggage, prisoners, cars for 
tollways,43 and tagging at the pallet level all goods and 
products destined for delivery to the U.S. Department of 
Defense.44   
                                                                                                                       
A Chip in Your Shoulder, SLATE.COM, Nov. 10, 2004, 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2109477/.
39 Catherine O’Connor, ODIN Benchmarks RFID ePC Tags, 
RFIDJOURNAL.COM, Oct. 21, 2004, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1199/1/1/.
40 Id.   
41 The Magic of RFID: How it Works, ACMQUEUE.COM, Oct. 2004, 
http://www.acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2
16&page=2.  
42 See id. (pointing out that advances in silicon chip conductivity will allow high 
frequency tags to be read from farther away in the future). 
43 Karen Dearne, Radio Tags Take to the Plains, AUSTRALIANITNEWS.COM,  
Nov. 9, 2004, 
http://australianit.news.com.au/articles/0,7204,11302583%5E15841%5E%5Enb
v%5E,00.html.  
44 Darrell Dunn, Defense Department Delays RFID Deadline Until At Least 
February, INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, Nov. 12, 2004, 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=52601247. 
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2. ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES:  Combating drug 
counterfeiting in the pharmaceuticals industry.45 
3. STREAMLINING BUSINESS PROCESSES:  
Improving inventory control and reducing inefficiencies 
in the drug industry due to overstocking or expiry.46 
4. CURRENCY SUBSTITUTES:  Providing a 
substitute for regular money.47 
5. BORDER SECURITY:  Ensuring that low-risk 
individuals are able to safely traverse major international 
borders.48 
6. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY:  Creating new 
ways of ensuring that toxic substances are not illegally 
dumped into the environment.49   
7. HUMAN MONITORING:  Establishing new 
methods for track the movements and behavior of 
children.50  
Each application of RFID has the potential to be beneficial by increasing 
safety and accountability, as well as the potential to violate forms of 
privacy worth protecting.    
¶13 The most recent controversy over RFID emerged when the FDA 
announced its approval51 of the VeriChip, an implantable device carrying 
a unique key that hospitals and other health-care providers could use to 
instantaneously access medical records in an emergency situation. 52   
Privacy advocates responded to this new development by pointing out a 
host of potential problems with implanting such a chip:  1) VeriChip is 
                                                     
45 Martin Downs, Counterfeit Drugs: A Rising Public Health Problem, 
WEBMD.COM, http://my.webmd.com/content/Article/95/103346.htm. 
46 See Dearne, supra note 43. 
47 See Tracking Arcade Game Players, supra note 2. 
48 Nexus: Life in the Fast Lane—RFID Powers Border Crossing Program, 
AIMGLOBAL.ORG, May 15, 2004, 
http://www.aimglobal.org/members/news/templates/casestudies.asp?articleid=1
34&zoneid=25.  
49 Japan: Radio Tags Drafted for Eco-compliance, CNETASIA.COM, 
http://asia.cnet.com/news/systems/0,39037054,39186726,00.htm. 
50 See Best, supra note 8. 
51 Letter of Evaluation, Office of Device Evaluation of the Center For Devices 
and Radiological Health, VeriChip ™ Health Information Microtransponder 
System (Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data924642/0001068880004000587/ex99p2
.txt.   
52 See McHugh, supra note 38. 
 10
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 20 
not medically safe53; 2) the potential for unauthorized access to medical 
records is a serious drawback of the system54; and 3) without effective 
regulation prior to the wide-implementation of these implants, the 
likelihood of invasive data aggregation, improper violations of 
anonymity, and other violations of personal privacy is very high.55  
¶14 Of course, critics of RFID technology often overlook or 
intentionally downplay the fact that extremely Orwellian RFID systems 
would require an integrated network of readers in addition to the 
ubiquitous affixation of tags.  For an individual’s personally identifiable 
information to be transparent, tags must be 1) affixed to physical objects, 
2) close enough to readers to transmit whatever information they contain, 
and 3) not covered by fabric or obscured by other materials that interfere 
with data transmission.  But such critics accurately portray RFID as a 
technology that in its current and prospective uses represents a way for 
corporations to keep tabs on its clientele without any pro tanto benefit 
for ceding personal data. 
II. UNDERSTANDING WHAT RFID MEANS FOR CONSUMER PRIVACY 
¶15 If RFID were to become pervasive, it would certainly be one of 
the most powerful single modalities of surveillance.  Where video 
surveillance is hobbled by the current limitations of facial recognition 
technology, even passive RFID tags could allow for accurate 
identification of individuals in a reader-rich environment. 56   Where 
paying cash for consumer purchases allows one to avoid leaving an 
electronic trail for interested parties to investigate, RFID may in Europe 
soon be embedded in currency, leaving no option for the privacy-
conscious consumer who wants her purchases to remain anonymous.57  
And where individual credit card companies are only able to analyze and 
                                                     
53 See Letter of Evaluation, supra note 51, at 3 (“The potential risks to health 
associated with the device are: adverse tissue reaction; migration of implanted 
transponder; compromised information security; failure of implanted 
transponder; failure of inserter; failure of electronic scanner; electromagnetic 
interference; electrical hazards; magnetic resonance imaging incompatibility; 
and needle stick.”).   
54 Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) VeriChip Page, EPIC.ORG, at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/verichip.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
55 FDA Approves Computer Chip, supra note 5. 
56 However, hardware-based object recognition technology has recently seen 
significant advances, allowing commercially available cameras to track basic 
motion, the appearance and movements of objects—including people, animals 
and automobiles.  Donna Howell, Video Surveillance Develops Sharper Sight, 
INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Oct. 20, 2004, at A04. 
57 Winston Chai, Euro Notes May Be Radio Tagged, ZDNETUK.COM, May 22, 
2003, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/0,39020645,2135074,00.htm. 
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assess data about the purchases you make with your particular credit 
card, a well-designed RFID reader-environment could very well 
assemble a comprehensive picture of your purchasing preferences.58  For 
example, a store equipped with a number of strategically placed RFID 
readers could assemble a portrait of a particular consumer’s preferences 
by tracking what items she selected while in the store and then making 
special offers on the basis of that portrait at the checkout counter.  Given 
that RFID readers have recently been miniaturized, it is not difficult to 
imagine companies—particularly businesses like Target and Walmart—
placing RFID readers at store entrances and exists, and at strategic points 
along store aisles for targeted-advertising purposes.59         
¶16 Even without a reader-rich environment, RFID is an especially 
invasive technology because it threatens to make it extremely easy for 
companies to gather, archive and utilize private data in three ways. First, 
embedding RFID tags in consumer goods allows companies to learn 
precisely what customers are buying by conditioning discounts and 
special offers upon revealing personal information that a consumer 
would otherwise want to remain private. 60   As noted above, such 
knowledge allows for highly efficient targeted-advertising, which some 
regard as an annoyance and others as a significant invasion of privacy.  
Regardless of whether such advertising is regarded as invasive by a 
particular customer, the lack of privacy protection represents an unfair 
burden on privacy-conscious consumers:  to object to RFID-enabled 
consumer surveillance, customers would have to forfeit the benefits 
associated with purchasing items from a particular store or carrying a 
tagged discount card.  In other words, even if RFID readers only appear 
                                                     
58 This is one way of conceptualizing the threat that RFID technology poses to 
consumer privacy.  However, even the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
has recognized the genuine threat RFID poses to the confidentiality of consumer 
information.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION 
SECURITY: RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, GAO-05-551 21 (May 2005) (“Profiling is the reconstruction of 
a person’s movements or transactions over a specific period of time, usually to 
ascertain something about the individual’s habits, tastes, or predilections. 
Because tags can contain unique identifiers, once a tagged item is associated 
with a particular individual, personally identifiable information can be obtained 
and then aggregated to develop a profile of the individual.”) 
59 See World’s Smallest RFID Reader Developed in UK, FERRET.COM, Dec. 6, 
2004, (reporting that the UK-based company Innovation Research & 
Technology has developed a 12mm by 2mm fully-operational RFID reader) 
available at http://www.ferret.com.au/articles/6d/0c029a6d.asp. 
60 For the purposes of this iBrief I assume, without providing an independent 
argument, that social policy should be designed with the privacy-conscious 
consumer in mind. 
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in department and outlet stores, the perceived and real costs of opting-out 
will be enough to coerce customers—customers who would otherwise 
not want their purchasing patterns archived—to accept this new 
technology on whatever non-negotiated terms retailers offer. 
¶17 Second, and closely related to the first objection, under extant 
privacy law companies could offer an opt-out policy but then lawfully 
shift the costs of opting out of a scheme like RFID to non-consenting 
consumers.  This could be done in a number of ways.  For example, 
companies already offer discount cards to customers that provide 
personal information.  The cost of offering discounts could be offset by 
customers who opt-out of RFID-enabled discount programs.  
Alternatively, mathematical forecasting models could predict the 
expected economic impact of (1) opt-out rates on RFID-card discount 
programs and (2) item-level tagging on gross revenues to spread the 
costs—i.e., expected diminution in sales—of adopting RFID by 
increasing the price of goods.61  In short, current privacy law allows 
companies to sidestep consumer resistance to RFID with the help of 
economic forecasting.   
¶18 Third, since increased advertising has a marked effect on 
purchasing patterns,62 and advertising generally is subject to protection 
under the First Amendment, existing privacy law actually subsidizes 
corporate speech where RFID is utilized as a technique for enhancing 
marketing efforts.  Privacy law subsidizes corporate speech because the 
technologies of advertising—in this case RFID—are paid for, in one way 
or another, by customers, and not by the private interests who benefit 
from those new advertising methods.63  To be sure, privacy law does not 
have the effect of subsidizing corporate speech (advertising) in cases 
where the costs of marketing methods is not borne by a company’s target 
market.  But in cases where such costs are shouldered by consumers, 
corporate speech is certainly being subsidized.  Put another way, if 
meaningful legislation giving consumers an opt-in right is not enacted, 
                                                     
61 Here it is important to note that economists would insist that the survival of 
RFID depends critically on whether it does lower the cost of distributing goods.  
Whether RFID would in all industries is beyond the scope of this iBrief; suffice 
it to say that many large retailers currently assume that RFID will reduce the 
costs of distributing goods and should therefore be adopted.   
62 See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Commercial Speech and the First 
Amendment: “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial 
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1215–17 (1988). 
63 To the best of my knowledge, the argument that current privacy law 
subsidizes corporate speech by not providing a mandatory opt-in option for 
consumers has not been made by any of the academic critics of RFID 
technology. 
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private companies could, without abrogating any law or legal principle, 
stealthily cajole consumers into supporting marketing efforts designed, 
ironically, to induce those very same consumers to spend more money.  
¶19 This discussion assumes, of course, that the terms offered will be 
unsavory to the privacy-conscious consumer.  In practice, this may not 
always be the case.  However, the argument of this iBrief does not turn 
on empirical facts about how many private companies are likely to 
provide a quid pro quo that privacy-conscious consumers find 
unappealing.  Rather, the argument here turns on whether consumers 
should have to cede even more information to private companies than 
they already do.  Critics of this argument could argue that consumers 
already give away much private information to private companies 
through opting-in to discount-card programs at retail outlets.  There is 
some truth to this, and indeed it would be odd to claim that the privacy 
threats posed by ordinary discount-cards and RFID technology are 
radically different.  Nevertheless, there are two powerful ripostes to this 
criticism.  First, because RFID tags are embedded in objects customers 
cannot decide in a particular circumstance to retain their privacy—as 
they surely can with discount-cards by not using them at the cash 
register.  Second, a technological standard for RFID tags is likely to 
emerge in the near future that would allow retailers to “read” the RFID 
tags of other retailers, thus learning the consumer preferences of their 
competitors’ customers without the permission of those customers.  In 
short, RFID is a technology that provides retailers a way to avoid ever 
asking their customers to provide any consent whatsoever to commercial 
monitoring practices. 
¶20 Given that (1) consumers are not provided with the choice to 
opt-in, (2) there are no safeguards in place to prevent companies from 
passing on the costs of RFID to consumers, and (3) the lack of such 
safeguards amounts to a mandatory subsidy of commercial speech, a 
control-oriented approach should be adopted in amending the Act.  A 
control-oriented approach would enhance consumer autonomy by 
providing an opportunity for consumers to opt out and it would prevent 
companies from passing on the costs of RFID to consumers in a furtive 
effort to subsidize commercial marketing efforts.  In other words, a well-
crafted amendment would address each of the three concerns previously 
examined. 
III. EAST COAST V. WEST COAST CODE: HOW SHOULD RFID BE 
REGULATED? 
¶21 Privacy law scholars familiar with technology have traditionally 
made a distinction between ‘East Coast’ code, that is, legal regulations 
that govern access to personal information, and ‘West Coast’ code, that 
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is, the body of rules and constraints built directly into a particular 
technology.  Both types of code can be helpful in regulatory contexts, 
and each has its own virtues and demerits.  But even though West Coast 
code is sometimes helpful in protecting liberal democratic values—
including privacy, free speech and personal dignity—in many instances 
this code will not effectively protect our values if not induced by law, by 
East Coast code, to do so.64 
¶22 Complicating this picture somewhat is the fact that EPCglobal, 
(formerly known as the Auto-ID center 65 ), a research consortium 
consisting of 5 major universities and over 100 private companies, has 
suggested that all RFID devices affixed to consumer goods include a kill 
switch. 66   This switch would deactivate the tag immediately after a 
purchase was completed, thereby making it impossible for companies to 
learn the origin, price, and unique identification number of clothing 
items, personal electronic devices, and other objects owned by 
customers. 67   Privacy initiatives such as these are certainly well-
intentioned, and the technological fixes they suggest are often quite 
reasonable.  But these initiatives share a common weakness:  private 
companies are not bound to abide by principles they voluntarily adopt.   
¶23 Current privacy law consists of federal laws and regulations—
including the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Act”), 68  the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 69  (“ECPA”), the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 197070 (“FCRA”) and the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act 71  (“HIPPA”)—as well as private tort law.  
Subsection A examines whether existing federal regulations and private 
tort law are sufficient to address the privacy implications of RFID.  
Subsection B introduces a proposed amendment to the Privacy Act, and 
considers how effective such an amendment might be in preventing 
RFID abuses.  
                                                     
64 See generally, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999) (arguing that West Coast code is often unwilling or unable to protect core 
liberal values, including privacy and free speech). 
65 The Auto-ID Center is now known as EPC Global, Inc.  See generally 
WELCOME TO EPCGLOBAL, INC, http://www.epcglobalinc.org (last visited Aug. 
25, 2005). 
66 Paul Boutin, We Know What You’re Buying, SLATE.COM, Sep. 5, 2003, at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2087976/.
67 Id.   
68 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). 
69 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522, 2701-2709, 3121-3126 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). 
70 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(u) (1994).   
71 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections 29 and 42 of U.S.C.).   
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 A.  The Limits of Extant Privacy Law  
¶24 Existing privacy law is not flexible enough to cover potential 
abuses of RFID.  Consider first the federal laws and corresponding 
regulations that constrain data collection.  The Act, as mentioned earlier, 
does not apply until data or information has been collected.72  According 
to the Government Accountability Office, “the Privacy Act is likely to 
have a limited application to the implementation of RFID technology 
because the act only applies to the information once it is collected, not to 
whether or how to collect it.”73  The Act provides citizens a right to 
review private information collected by government agencies,74 and a 
concomitant right to correct misinformation, 75  but the Act does not 
currently contemplate the myriad dimensions of data privacy implicated 
by new surveillance technologies.76 
¶25 The ECPA and the FCRA do not fare any better.  The ECPA 
provides a number of important regulations for electronic 
communications, including a general bar against peddling personal 
information culled through electronic transactions. 77   Unfortunately, 
“information” under the EPCA only refers to the contents of 
communications; transactional records can lawfully be disclosed, even 
sold, so long as the purchaser is not the federal government.78  Thus, 
while RFID systems capable of recording consumer conversations could 
very well fall under the ECPA, this statute could not readily be used to 
prevent companies from culling and sharing transactional data. 79   
                                                     
72 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
73 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 60, at 23. 
74 5 U.S.C. § 552(d)(1). 
75 Id. § 552(d)(2)-(3). 
76 See Jerry Kang, Informational Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1193, 1231 (1998) (arguing that the Privacy Act, and other omnibus 
privacy statutes, utterly fail to protect data privacy because “they apply only to 
government action”).   
77 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c)-(d); see also Kang, supra note 76, at 1234 (pointing out 
that data aggregators cannot “divulge the contents of the communications during 
transmission or while in storage”). 
78 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A).   
79 The Senate Report accompanying the ECPA makes it very clear that the 
content of a communication is distinct from the status or existence of the 
transaction itself.  Thus, when the ECPA is read in light of its legislative intent, 
it is virtually impossible to argue that it prohibits the free sharing of 
transactional data.  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 13 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567; see also Kang, supra note 76, at 1235 (“The upshot 
of this analysis is that the ECPA constrains a communication provider's 
exploitation of personal information in only limited ways.  Although electronic 
communications providers to the public must keep the contents of 
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Similarly, FCRA, would not be of much help.  In addition to being 
designed for a completely unrelated regulatory purpose the FCRA does 
not even constrain what third-party payment providers can do with 
sensitive consumer information,80and courts have consistently held that 
such information can be exchanged with impunity as long as a 
“legitimate business interest” can be identified.81   
¶26 Robust opt-in rules, however, have been adopted for healthcare 
information under HIPAA.  In fact, HIPAA’s privacy rule82 requires 
health care providers to obtain explicit consent prior to using or 
disclosing sensitive health information.83  The privacy rule is far from 
toothless, as HIPAA84 provides for stiff civil and criminal penalties for 
violations of patients’ privacy rights.85  The privacy rule prohibits the use 
or disclosure of health information which identifies or can be associated 
with a particular individual without prior consent, requires that 
healthcare providers and health-information clearinghouses take 
reasonable steps to notify individuals of their privacy rights, and requires 
that a report be made to patients whenever there is an intentional or 
negligent disclosure of their data.86  But unfortunately, HIPAA’s privacy 
rule only covers health-care information; it is not a generally applicable 
privacy law.87  
¶27 Tort law and Supreme Court jurisprudence have proven 
disappointing as well.  Tort law recognizes four different kinds of 
privacy violations, including (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public 
disclosure of private facts, (3) appropriation of name or likeness, and (4) 
publicity that places another in a false light.88   Some scholars have 
                                                                                                                       
communications confidential, they have almost no such obligation regarding 
transactional records.”). 
80 15 U.S.C. §§ 1581a(d), 1581b(3)(e); see also Kang, supra note 76, at 1236. 
81 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An 
Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 80 
(1996). 
82 Standard for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 
C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.506 (2002).   
83 Id. 
84 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5(a)(1), 1320d-6(b) (2000). 
85 See Mary L. Durham, Note, How Research Will Adapt to HIPAA: A View from 
Within the Healthcare Delivery System, 28 AM. J. L. AND MED. 491, 500 (2002) 
(“HIPAA imposes civil penalties of up to $ 25,000 and criminal penalties of up 
to $ 250,000 or ten years in prison for every violation.”). 
86 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2001). 
87 See generally, Ryan Lowther, Note, U.S. Privacy Regulations Dictated by EU 
Law: How the Healthcare Profession May be Regulated, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2003). 
88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D, 652C, 652E (1977). 
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argued that the first tort—intrusion upon seclusion—could in theory be 
actionable without a violation of one’s physical space.89  This argument 
would be specious if applied to RFID:  absent federal privacy 
regulations, the prevalence of RFID tags would probably not be regarded 
as “highly offensive to the reasonable person,”90 a requirement for tort 
liability under the Restatement Second of Torts.  In addition, there is no 
constitutional right to informational privacy, although on one occasion 
the Supreme Court did come close to endorsing such a right.  In Whalen 
v. Roe,91 a case about whether a state recordkeeping statute violated 
privacy, the Court cleverly avoided deciding whether there exists a clear 
right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution.92  While the majority did 
intimate that under some circumstances the government may have a 
constitutional obligation to “avoid unwarranted disclosures,”93 the Court 
did not specify what those circumstances might be nor was it willing to 
extend such hypothetical privacy protections to contexts in which data is 
collected by private, non-governmental organizations.94    
¶28 There are a number of advantages to Congressional action 
recognized by scholars in the broader context of protecting private data 
from unwanted collection and use.95  And although privacy consortiums 
and interest groups periodically resist the efforts of corporations to 
collect private data, efforts at the federal,96 state,97 and local98 level to 
                                                     
89 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1089, 1106 (1998). 
90 RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 652B cmt. a, b. 
91 429 U.S. 589 (1977).   
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 605.  
94 Id. 
95 See Kang, supra note 76, at 1246–66 (arguing that Congressional regulation is 
often necessary because market forces alone do not protect privacy to a 
reasonably acceptable degree). 
96 For examples of general opt-in legislation at the federal level, see Consumer's 
Right to Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 2720, 107th Cong. (2001); Privacy Act of 
2001, S. 1055, 107th Cong. (2001); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail 
Act of 2001, H.R. 718, 107th Cong. (2001); Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 
2201, 107th Cong. (2001); Financial Institution Privacy Protection Act of 2001, 
S. 450, 107th Cong. (2001); Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act, H.R. 
347, 107th Cong. (2001); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001, 
H.R. 95, 107th Cong. (2001). 
97 For examples of proposals at the state level, see S.B. 1258, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. 
(Ariz. 2002); Financial Privacy Protection Act of 2002, A.B. 1775, 2001-02 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); H.F. 285, 79th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001); 
Consumer Privacy Act, S.B. 2988, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); Consumer 
Internet Privacy Act, S.B. 4402, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 1547, 48th 
Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2001). 
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adopt opt-in privacy standards for personal data have often failed.  The 
very fact that these efforts have failed evidences not only the political 
influence that private companies possess, but also the necessity of 
amending the Act.  Congress is, however, aware of the problem.  In 
recent congressional hearings on the privacy implications of RFID, Paula 
J. Bruening of the Center for Democracy and Technology deftly 
articulated the importance of enacting sensible privacy protections before 
RFID becomes ubiquitous: 
[I]t is more effective and efficient to begin at the outset of the 
development process to create a culture of privacy that incorporates 
sound technical protections for privacy and that establishes the key 
business and public policy decisions for respecting privacy in RFID use 
before RFID is deployed, rather than building in privacy after a scandal 
or controversy erupts publicly.99
B.  A Privacy Act for the Digital Age 
¶29 The Act should be amended to explicitly apply a control-oriented 
privacy approach to the activities of private corporations and providers of 
consumer services and goods.  This iBrief proposes the following 
amendment to the Act:  
Under the Privacy Act of 1974, as hereby amended, corporations have a 
statutory obligation to (1) minimize the amount of data collected and 
preserve individual anonymity whenever possible, and (2) in contexts 
where anonymity cannot for technological or administrative reasons be 
protected, obtain explicit permission from citizens to use (a) personally 
identifying information for specific purposes disclosed to the consumer 
and (b) information that aggregates consumer data in ways that threaten 
                                                                                                                       
98 For examples of successful legislation at the local level, see Contra Costa 
County, Cal., Code ch. 518-4 (2002) (requiring financial institutions to obtain 
explicit consumer consent before disseminating private data); Daly City, Cal., 
Ordinance 1295 (Sept. 9, 2002) (requiring notice and consent prior to the 
disclosure of private financial information); Daly City, Cal., Ordinance 1297 
(Nov. 12, 2002) (same); S.F., Cal., Bus. & Tax Regs. Code art. 20 (2002) 
(same); San Mateo County, Cal., Ordinance 4126 (Aug. 6, 2002) (regulating the 
disclosure of confidential consumer information), San Mateo County, Cal., 
Ordinance 4144 (Nov. 5, 2002) (same). 
99 RFID Technology: What the Future Holds for Commerce, Security, and the 
Consumer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 28 (2004) 
(statement of Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and 
Technology). 
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consumer anonymity whenever a new tracking technology is used for a 
substantially commercial purpose.100   
Under the amended Act, (3) private companies may not discriminate 
against consumers who refuse to have their personal information 
collected via RFID or similar technologies.  Private companies may not 
provide differential services, preference programs, or special incentives 
despite whatever differential costs are associated with selling goods or 
providing services to non-consenting consumers that are not associated 
with selling or providing similar goods or services to consumers who 
consent to have their personal information archived and used for fully 
disclosed purposes.  
¶30 Provision (1) is the data-minimization principle, necessary to 
prevent corporate interests from collecting, archiving, using and selling 
data in a format that violates anonymity.  This is the fundamental rule of 
the amendment, for it stipulates that consumer anonymity is a more 
important value than targeted advertising.  For instance, this provision, 
when read in conjunction with provision (2), would make it unlawful for 
Wal-Mart to associate purchase-related data gathered via RFID with 
specific customers unless explicit consent had been obtained prior to data 
collection.  Notice also that provision (1), when read in conjunction with 
(2), prohibits collecting specific types of data for which a company has 
not already obtained permission.101   
¶31 Provision (2) is the opt-in principle, necessary to prevent 
companies from collecting data surreptitiously from consumers and then 
using that data in unauthorized ways.  This provision has much in 
common with standard opt-out principles that have already been 
proposed or promulgated in connection with informational privacy.102  
The main difference between provision (2) and standard opt-out 
                                                     
100 Provision (2) shares some similarities with a bill introduced in the House of 
Representatives in 2004, commonly referred to as the Opt Out of ID Chips Act.  
Though never enacted, the Act would have (a) required warning labels on all 
products carrying RFID tags, and (b) provided consumers with a right to have 
RFID tags permanently disabled at the time of purchase.  See H.R. 4673, 108th 
Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:H.R.4673.IH:.  
101 Provision (1) is somewhat similar to Professor Kang’s proposed default rule 
for governing cyberspace transactions:  “Such personal information may be 
processed only in functionally necessary ways” but parties are “free to contract 
around the default rule.”  Kang, supra note 76, at 1268. 
102 For a good example of a federal statute and regulatory regime based on opt-
out principles, see the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 502, 113 
Stat. 1338, 1437-40 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
(outlining the obligations of financial institutions regarding the disclosure of 
personal information).  
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principles is that companies would have to obtain explicit consent from 
customers before collecting and using their personal data.  It is possible 
that an opt-in provision would make RFID-enabled data collection more 
expensive, since the costs of data collection would include the time and 
resources expended to obtain explicit consent.103  But this is a virtue—
not a drawback—of this proposed amendment.    
¶32 Provision (3) is the anti-discrimination principle, a provision 
indispensable to protect consumers from shouldering the cost of opting-
out of a data-collection scheme like RFID.  For instance, this provision 
would have the welcome effect of preventing, at least in some cases, 
companies from offering wildly differential pricing to customers who 
decided to opt-out of an RFID-discount card program.  This is perhaps 
the most politically controversial aspect of the proposed amendment, 
because industry advocacy groups would certainly view this provision as 
a way to stifle completely the “right” of private companies to provide 
incentives for customers to willingly reveal personal information.        
CONCLUSION 
¶33 The proposal outlined in this iBrief is modest, pragmatic, and 
most importantly, proportional to the threat that RFID represents to 
informational privacy.  Nonetheless, it is a proposal that is clearly out of 
line with our current practices.  We are all to ready to disclose private 
aspects of our lives to commercial entities, too eager to give up forms of 
anonymity that we would do better to insist upon.104  Recent trends to 
trade away privacy protections are often predicated upon misplaced, 
erroneous notions that technological progress is an unqualified good, a 
claim grounded in the unchallenged assumption that the technology 
industry itself is committed to antigovernment libertarianism. 105   
                                                     
103 See generally, Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, The Impact of Opt-in 
Privacy Rules on Retail Credit Markets: A Case Stud of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J. 
745 (2003) (arguing that opt-in rules generally neutralize the many of the 
efficiency gains obtained through technologically advanced data collection 
techniques). 
104 Even fervent privacy advocates have accepted the dubious notion that 
industry-driven controls are preferable to legislative action.  See Declan 
McCullagh, RFID Tags: Big Brother in Small Packages, CNET.COM, Jan. 13, 
2003, http://ecoustics-
cnet.com.com/RFID+tags+Big+Brother+in+small+packages/2010-1069_3-
980325.html?tag=nl.  
105 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM 
IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 127 (2004) (“The entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley like to 
think of themselves as antigovernment libertarians, and the business nostrums of 
the era before the dot-com crash assumed that the Internet would lead inevitably 
to the end of hierarch and centralized authority and the flourishing of individual 
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Corporations, whether they are steeped in new technology or firmly 
grounded in the world of bricks-and-mortar, have never been committed 
as a matter of principle to something as heady and theoretical as 
libertarianism.  Even well-intentioned private efforts, such as 
EPCglobal’s suggestion that RFID tags be disabled once purchases are 
made, can be voluntarily disregarded and do not carry the force and 
legitimacy of law. 
¶34 Early international norms governing privacy also failed to take 
seriously the threat posed by corporate stalking.  For instance, in 1950 
Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Convention”) was adopted, 
declaring that “everyone has a right to respect for his private and family 
life” and that “there shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except as in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of a country.”106  Fortunately, 
international treaties and agreements ratified since the Convention have 
not echoed its curious assumption that privacy can only be violated by 
governmental agencies.107  
¶35 But international privacy norms have been no match for the 
“wait and see” attitude that businesses benefiting from RFID technology 
have been selling to the public and legislators alike.  For example, a 
recent California bill108 designed to set basic and reasonable standards for 
RFID systems was steamrolled when Hewlett Packard, the American 
Electronics Association, and the California Grocers Association argued 
                                                                                                                       
creativity.  When the e-businesses technologies of tracking, classifying, 
profiling, and monitoring were used to identify the preferences of American 
consumers and to mirror back to each of us a market segmented version of 
ourselves, Silicon Valley could argue that it was serving the cause of freedom 
and individual choice.”).   
106 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1953), reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW & WORLD ORDER: BASIC 
DOCUMENTS III.B.2 (Burns H. Weston ed., 5 vols., 1994) available at    
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. 
107 See European Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to 
the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, signed on Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. 
108, 20 I.L.M. 317 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1985); Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, available at http://www.dataprivacy.ie/6aii.htm. 
108 See S.B. 1834, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), available at 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/academics/courses/is205/s05/Cal%20Sen%20B%
201834%20(2004).pdf. 
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that “premature” regulation would “have unintended consequences” 
although “[these industry groups] did not elaborate on those 
consequences.”109  This “wait and see” attitude encourages Congress and 
the citizenry at large to accept the truly fantastic idea that private 
corporations will self-regulate a $900 million-dollar market—expected to 
reach $2.3 billion by 2010—to protect consumer privacy.110  As one 
particularly astute citizen recently explained, the public is often 
hoodwinked into dubious new technology because during its 
development the associated social costs are either ignored completely or 
cleverly minimized by private companies:    
In our society, technology advances in a vacuum—the morality and 
actual usefulness of a product is never considered while a technology is 
under development; once it is developed, [corporations] assume they 
have a right that supercedes the rights of all others to make money off a 
product, regardless of how it affects other people.  Marketing merely 
steps into that vacuum . . . and markets technology without a thought as 
to its adverse effects.111
¶36 This critique exaggerates somewhat the notion that RFID has 
been developed and marketed ‘without a thought as to its adverse 
                                                     
109 Claire Swedberg, California RFID Legislation Rejected, RFIDJOURNAL.COM, 
July 5, 2004, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1015/1/1/.  Since 
SB 1834 was defeated, California lawmakers have introduced the Identity 
Information Protection Act of 2005, an act that in its original form would have 
prohibited the use of RFID tags in a range of identification cards in California, 
including driver’s licenses, school ID-cards, and any identification card 
associated with a government benefit program.  See S.B. 682, 2005 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2005), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0651-
0700/sb_682_bill_20050511_amended_sen.pdf.  After strong resistance by the 
RFID lobby in California, the bill was amended twice to “allow the RFID 
technology if it contains a unique personal identifier and not personal 
information, such as an individual’s name, address, telephone number, date of 
birth, Social Security Number or biometric identifier, among others.”  Dibya 
Sarkar, California Lawmakers Soften RFID Stance, FWC.COM, Jun. 28, 2005, 
http://www.fcw.com/article89416-06-28-05-Web.  Unfortunately, these 
amendments were not deemed sufficient to justify moving the bill forward by 
the California Assembly’s Appropriations Committee, which recently “decided 
to sideline the proposed law until next year.”  Alorie Gilbert, California Shelves 
RFID Ban, ZDNETNEWS, Aug. 26, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-
5843867.html. 
110 Tony Hallett, RFID Becoming Billion-Dollar Market, SILICON.COM, Apr. 19, 
2004, http://hardware.silicon.com/storage/0,39024649,39120064,00.htm.
111 Letter from Steve Grant, United States citizen, to Declan McCullagh, Chief 
Political Correspondent, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 30, 2004), 
http://news.com.com/5208-1039-
0.html?forumID=1&threadID=1979&messageID=10303&start=-1.  
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effects.’  Many RFID applications will undoubtedly have a direct, 
positive impact on human health and safety.  For example, Applied 
Digital’s VeriChip technology will one allow doctors in emergency 
contexts to access medical records instantly.  Nevertheless, it is worth 
remembering that new technologies are often embraced not because they 
are genuinely useful or necessary—but rather because they are already 
available and ready-to-hand.  The amendment proposed in this iBrief has 
the virtue of allowing consumers a choice:  it gives consumers the power 
to reflectively endorse RFID, instead of merely accepting the ubiquity of 
this technology after large, politically powerful companies have decided 
that a radio frequency future is the only future.    
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